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SCRATCH MY BACK, AND I’LL 
SCRATCH YOURS: SCRATCHING THE 
SURFACE OF THE DUTY OF CARE IN 
CROSS SECTOR COLLABORATIONS – 
ARE FOR-PROFITS OBLIGATED TO 
ENSURE THE SUSTAINABILITY OF 
THEIR PARTNER NONPROFITS? 
 
Christyne J. Vachon, Esq.* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
“[I]t is continually becoming more evident that values-based 
leadership, synergistic generation of social and economic value, and 
strategic cross-sector alliances are key ingredients to achieving sustainably 
successful business.”1 
The cross-sector interactions between Nonprofit and For-profit 
institutions create rich opportunities to explore new and varied corporate 
dynamism through collaboration on the path to a philanthropic goal (the 
“Collaboration”).  Each organization offers opportunities to the other 
collaborating entity from which to gain.  In this way, a Nonprofit can 
benefit from collaborating in a cross-sector Collaboration from, among 
other things, access to funds,2 resource and time donations, availability of 
 
* Christyne J. Vachon is a private practitioner in For-profit and Nonprofit law.  She is a  
Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, School of Law. 
Professor Vachon is a member of the board of several nonprofit organizations and former in-house 
counsel for a venture capital company.  Professor Vachon wishes to thank the friends and colleagues 
with whom she worked, including George Kuney, Joan Heminway, Paula Schaeffer, Jennifer 
Hendricks, Sophia Brown, David Osborne, and Holly Lusk for research assistance, and the University 
of Tennessee, Knoxville for its support during the research and writing process. 
 1. James E. Austin & Ezequiel Reficco, Corporate Social Entrepreneurship, 11 INT’L J. NOT-
FOR-PROFIT L. 86, 90 (2009). 
 2. Gail A. Lasprogata & Marya N. Cotten, “Contemplating Enterprise”: The Business and Legal 
Challenges of Social Entrepreneurship, 41 AM. BUS. L. J. 67, 73–74 (2003) (stating that entrepreneurial 
ventures provide Nonprofits access to a flow of income that is reliable and protect against the feast or 
famine of grant and private donation funding). 
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new ideas, learning and expertise,3 developing new contacts and business 
avenues,4 and broadening the Nonprofit’s market.5  In turn, For-profits may 
benefit from the Collaboration by improving good will and respectability 
of the corporate image, engendering trust, accessing new learning, creating 
new markets,6 and attracting new employees.7  To accomplish effective 
implementation and continuation of the Collaboration, both entities should 
be aware of the possible corporate governance issues posed by the 
Collaboration and the corresponding options for the business.  Too 
frequently the legal issues, such as corporate governance, are marginalized 
by management in favor of the business issues.8  The legalities can affect 
the business’ viability and productivity depending on the information 
known and decisions made, and therefore, should be an integral part of 
management decision making.9 
In Part II, this paper will explain the concept of the Collaboration, its 
relevance to the Nonprofit and For-profit individually, and the 
Collaboration’s path along a continuum of ever increasing levels of 
engagement between the Nonprofit and For-profit (“Continuum”).  By 
examining the Collaboration from the perspective of the Continuum, this 
paper will evaluate in Part III the duty of care of the entities’ boards of 
directors and related management with similar authority (“Board and 
Others”), and its application in the context of the cross-sector dynamic for 
the Nonprofit and For-profit.  The paper will further explore whether the 
duty of care owed to the For-profit implicates a responsibility on the part of 
the For-profit’s Board and Others to ensure proper care and sustainability 
of the Nonprofit in the Collaboration, especially in light of the fact that 
affiliation with the Nonprofit alone can improve the For-profit’s image.  
 
 3. Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 2, at 96–97.  See also J. Gregory Dees, Philanthropy and 
Enterprise: Harnessing the Power of Business and Entrepreneurship For Social Change, SESSION IV:  
SOCIAL ENTERPRISE AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE, 5 (Aug. 2, 2007, 12:45 PM) http:// www. 
brookings.edu/global/aspen/2007dees.pdf. 
 4. Dees, supra note 3. 
 5. JAMES E. AUSTIN, THE COLLABORATION CHALLENGE: HOW NONPROFITS AND BUSINESSES 
SUCCEED THROUGH STRATEGIC ALLIANCE 90–92 (2000).  See generally Dennis R. Young & Lester M. 
Salamon (2002) Commercialization, Social Ventures, & For-Profit Competition, in THE STATE OF 
NONPROFIT AMERICA (2002). 
 6. Austin & Reficco, supra note 1, at 96; See Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 2, at 96.  See also 
Dees, supra note 3, at 7–8 (discussing the difference between investors and philanthropic entrepreneurs 
and the impact they can have on improving social conditions through “supporting social enterprise to 
achieve social impact,” “helping social enterprise move into mainstream capital markets,” and 
“supporting socially beneficial forms of private enterprise”). 
 7. See generally Young & Salamon, supra note 5; AUSTIN, supra note 5, at 88, 93.  See also 
Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 2, at 96 (describing that how a For-profit company that develops a 
philanthropic approach can increase their business development and appeal to new employees); 
Elizabeth A. Weeks, The Ethical Health Lawyer: Loopholes: Opportunity, Responsibility, or Liability?, 
35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 320, 320–21 (2007). 
 8. Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 2, at 70. 
 9. Id. 
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This conclusion will vary depending on where the Collaboration is along 
the Continuum. 
 
II.  COLLABORATION 
 
The Nonprofit and For-profit are very different types of organizations.  
On a very basic level, the cultures of the two types of organizations differ 
greatly.10  With the changing business and economic climate, the dynamics 
of each type of organization are shifting.  With increasing shortage of 
funding, Nonprofits are devising means to raise funds which often 
resemble those of For-profits, including collaborating with For-profits.11  
On the other hand, due to recent corporate scandals and greater 
appreciation by the public of the value of the commons, the For-profits are 
often incorporating corporate philanthropy into the business plan.12  The 
Collaboration has become an integral part of the strategy of these 
organizations to increase their value.13  It is not a new idea; Nonprofits and 
For-profits have been collaborating for years with increasing frequency.14  
In earlier forms, cross sector Collaborations mainly occurred in the areas of 
educational reform, cultural opportunities, and environmental concerns in 
various communities where the collaborating businesses operated.15  
“These alliances are the vehicles for achieving what the [corporate social 
entrepreneurship] definition referred to as extending the firm’s domain of 
competence and corresponding opportunity set through innovative 
leveraging of resources outside its direct control.”16  The Collaboration 
between the For-profit and the Nonprofit has been described as occurring 
on a continuum, with increasing levels of integration (“Continuum”).17  The 
Continuum is useful to understanding the varying levels of involvement the 
collaborating entities may engage in and the corresponding duty of care 
responsibilities. 
 
 
 10. Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 2, at 100. 
 11. Alan R. Andreasen, Profits For Nonprofits: Find a Corporate Partner, HARV. BUS. REV. 47, 
48 (1996). 
 12. Id. at 56 (indicating that a sizeable percentage of consumers stated that when price and quality 
of competing products are equal, the consumer considers a corporation’s business practices and a 
greater percentage would pay a “premium” on products of companies that support a cause they care 
about). 
 13. Austin & Reficco, supra note 1, at 89. 
 14. Howard P. Tuckman, Commercialization and For-Profits in Disguise, in INT’L ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF CIVIL SOC’Y 504, 504 (2010). 
 15. Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 2, at 95. 
 16. Austin & Reficco, supra note 1, at 89. 
 17. James Austin, Collaboration Between Nonprofits and Business, 29 HARV. BUS. SCH. 
NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR QUARTERLY SUPPLEMENT 69, 71 (2000) [hereinafter Austin 
Collaboration]. 
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A.  FOR-PROFITS AND THE COLLABORATION 
 
The corporation is a creature of law formed to emphasize one “good” 
over others in the interest of the owners of the corporation, the 
shareholders.  This tradition is often referred to as “shareholder primacy.”18  
And the referenced “good” is profit maximization.19  Historically, state 
corporate law held that Boards and Others owed a fiduciary duty only to 
the shareholders, and therefore, their emphasis was on the profit motive.20  
Currently, however, promoters for socially accountable For-profits and 
other social entrepreneurs have been effecting change in the thinking, laws, 
rules and incentive structures to allow for, and arguably, try to ensure 
increased social responsibility of For-profits.21  Some argue that this 
approach has not changed the fiduciary duty since, in fact, taking into 
account the outside effects of the corporate activities it has the potential to 
prop up the bottom line.  This still aligns with the traditional duty to the 
shareholder.22 
In recent years painful examples of greed and corporate power, such 
as the Enron, Worldcom, Tyco, and Madoff scandals, have made the public 
and government sensitive to and vigilante of the conduct of For-profits.23  
In light of the scandals, new laws, changing business ethics, and increased 
scrutiny and/or support from the public and regulators, For-profits find 
themselves responding to and developing a new atmosphere with emphasis 
on corporate philanthropy, including at times, resorting to Collaborations 
with Nonprofits.24  This is true especially in light of the shift in public 
appreciation of the commons and the new emphasis placed on corporate 
 
 18. Jonathan D. Springer, Corporate Law Corporate Constituency Statutes: Hollow Hopes and 
False Fears,  ANN. SURV. AM. L. 85, 87 (1999). 
 19. Lawrence E. Mitchell, Cooperation and Constraint in the Modern Corporation: An Inquiry 
into the Causes of Corporate Immorality, 73 TEX. L. REV. 477, 501 (1995). 
 20. Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Stakeholders: A Contractual Perspective, 43 U. TORONTO L. J. 
401, 401 (1993). 
 21. DAVID BORNSTEIN & SUSAN DAVIS, SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS 
TO KNOW 4-5 (2010). 
 22. Springer, supra note 18, at 88. 
 23. Weeks, supra note 1, at 320. 
 24. Id.  See Austin & Reficco, supra note 1, at 87 (noting that corporate social reporting leads to 
serious implications and controversy as to the nature of evolving contemporary capitalism.  It directly 
implies institutional adjustments in the structure and process of the market economy.  The import of an 
evolving capitalism lends the subject of corporate social reporting a certain public significance); Martha 
Minow, Partners, Not Rivals?: Redrawing the Lines Between Public and Private, Nonprofit and Profit, 
and Secular and Religious, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1061, 1066 (2000) (“Examples of profit/Nonprofit 
collaborations go far beyond corporate volunteering and financial donations to Nonprofit social 
agencies.”); see also HAROLD L. JOHNSON, DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE SOCIAL PERFORMANCE: 
SURVEY, EVALUATION, AND PROSPECTS 1, 3 (1979) (discussing corporate accounting, “corporate 
reports on social performance beyond that implied in traditional financial data” either for use in the 
organization or published externally for varying audiences). 
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ethics and governance.25  In general, many perceive For-profits as entering 
into Collaborations with Nonprofits so they can “bask in the glow of their 
esteemed partners.”26  For-profits may, indeed, seek a Collaboration with a 
Nonprofit hoping that the Nonprofit’s image will help to better define the 
For-profit’s image, enhance it, or repair it.27  Many For-profits approach the 
Collaboration as an opportunity to improve their reputation, and 
consequently, their relationships with their customers.28  There are other 
collaborative benefits, however, that attract For-profits, such as “creating 
an enabling environment, fostering corporate social entrepreneurs, 
amplifying corporate purpose and values, generating double value, [and] 
building strategic alliances.”29  For-profits may save on advertising and 
promotional costs due to the free opportunities that arise from the 
Collaboration.30  The For-profit also gains access to a whole new avenue 
for potential customers: the Nonprofit’s staff, clients, members, donors, 
etc.31  This concept is echoed by Starbuck’s Vice President of Business 
Practices, a Collaboration allows the company: 
to extend our reach to areas where we have interests, but perhaps 
not influence or expertise.  It’s a real extension of what we can do, 
and often what we would like to do, or what our customers expect 
us to do—issues that are very complex and difficult to solve.32 
However, the Collaboration may not be easily substantiated by the 
Board and Others as a worthwhile use of the For-profit’s resources given 
the traditional nature of the For-profit. 
 
B.  NONPROFITS AND THE COLLABORATION 
 
A Nonprofit is a business entity created under and governed by state 
law, intended for a philanthropic purpose.  The tax-exempt Nonprofit 
 
 25. Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 2, at 95. 
 26. Andreasen, supra note 11, at 50. 
 27. Andreasen, supra note 11, at 56. 
 28. Id. at 50 (stating that “consumers respond to the halo effect”). 
 29. Austin & Reficco, supra note 1, at 87. 
 30. Andreasen, supra note 11, at 56. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Austin & Reficco, supra note 1, at 90 (quoting Susan Mecklenburg, Starbucks Vice President 
of Business Practices discussing Starbuck’s partnership with Conservation International to promote 
environmentally sustainably production of coffee in Chiapas, Mexico). 
This Nonprofit brought to partnership its environmental expertise and its capacity to 
work with small farmers.  Starbucks contributed its knowledge of quality coffee 
production and its marketing channels.  This entrepreneurial combination of distinctive 
competencies created a process that developed new production techniques and new 
supply of organic coffee for Starbucks, which in turn generated significant income 
enhancements to the farmers and improved environmental conditions in the growing 
areas.  This initial partnership expanded to other countries and even led to the 
reformulation of Starbuck’s basic coffee procurement criteria and procedures. 
Id. 
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created under federal law is governed in the United States primarily by the 
Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”).33  In particular, Section 501 of the 
Code provides the primary source for the exemption from taxation.34  
Section 501(a) of the Code allows for exemption from federal income tax 
for any organization that meets the criteria of Section 501(c) of the Code, 
the “charitable exemption.”35  The tax-exempt status of a Nonprofit allows 
the organization to be exempt from the obligation to pay certain federal 
taxes, such as excise tax and employment taxes.36  Further, this federal 
determination relieves the organization of some of the state taxation. 
Traditionally, distinguishing itself from For-profits, the Nonprofit 
continued its operations by relying on grants from the government and 
private foundations, donations from private individuals, and fees for 
services.37 This characteristic distinguishes Nonprofits from For-profits.  
However, this traditionally clear line between For-profits and Nonprofits 
has increasingly become blurred as Nonprofits pursue increased 
commercial activity, including Collaborations.38  Principally, there is so 
much competition for limited resources in a very challenging economy, 
which necessitates the Nonprofit to look for ways to raise funds in 
nontraditional ways, a more commercialized approach.39 
 
 33. Austin & Reficco, supra note 1, at 90 (“Section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code provides 
several different categories of organization types for which tax-exempt status is an option.”).  See also 
Michael W. Peregrine, Legal Concerns in Specific Health Care Delivery Settings: Nonprofit Corporate 
Governance, in 3 HEALTH L. PRAC. GUIDE 43:2, 2 (2010) (“Furthermore, the determination of tax-
exempt status and charitable trust status are not necessarily one and the same.  A Nonprofit corporation 
is not automatically recognized by virtue of its state incorporation as exempt from income tax under the 
Internal Revenue Code (IRC).  Conversely, the lack of tax-exempt status under the IRC will not prevent 
the state regulators from concluding that all of the corporation’s assets are held for charitable purposes 
(consistent with its charitable dedication clause), notwithstanding a failure to obtain tax exemption.”). 
 34. 26 U.S.C.A. § 501(c)(3) (West 2010) and accompanying Treasury Regulations.  See PANEL ON 
THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, PRINCIPLES FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE AND ETHICAL PRACTICE: A GUIDE FOR 
CHARITIES AND FOUNDATIONS 8 (2007) [hereinafter PANEL]; Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 2, at 75. 
 35. 26 U.S.C.A. § 501(a)(c) (West 2010).  In addition: 
Often tax-exempt nonprofit organizations are referred to as “charitable” organizations.  
“Charitable” is actually the term used to describe one of the types of organizations that 
qualifies for tax exempt status under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.  
However, the word “charitable” has become accepted as a more generic term to apply to 
“religious,” “scientific,” “educational,” and other similar purposes for which 501(c) 
applies. 
Christyne J. Vachon, Blurring. Not Fading. Looking at the Duties of Care and Loyalty as Nonprofits 
Move Into Commercialism, 12 TRANSACTIONS: THE TENN. J. BUS. L. 37, 39 (2011).  See also 
Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 2, at 75. 
 36. Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 2, at 75. 
 37. Id. at 68. 
 38. Jude L. Fernando & Alan W. Heston, The Role of NGOs: Charity and Empowerment: 
Introduction: NGOs Between States, Markets and Civil Society, 554 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. 
SCI.  8, 11 (1997); Dees, supra note 3, at 1. 
 39. Andreasen, supra note 11, at 48; Tuckman, supra note 14, at 1 (indicating that a reason there is 
a growth in commercial activities by Nonprofits is the serious challenge to raise funds).  See also 
Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 2, at 68. 
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Commercialization may be the strongest force shaping Nonprofit 
business these days.40  Among other things, this step in commercialization 
has lead Nonprofits to enter into cross-sector Collaborations with For-
profits at various levels of engagement along the Continuum.  Working 
with a For-profit, the Nonprofit may seek, among other things, greater 
access to funds,41 business contacts, intellectual property, brand 
recognition, and education of employees.42  While Nonprofits may be 
selling products and services to make money to fund the mission, 
commercialization achieves deeper penetration through a Collaboration.43  
Nonprofits collaborate with For-profit companies as affiliates and partners, 
and even have For-profits as spin-offs and subsidiaries.44  These changes 
may be seen as admirable and promising as they may lead to greater 
independence and sustainability for Nonprofits.45  However, the 
Nonprofit’s activities in the Collaboration and the effect of the 
Collaboration on the Nonprofit need to be carefully monitored and 
evaluated by the Board and Others depending on where the Collaboration 
is on the Continuum. 
 
C.  THE CROSS-SECTOR COLLABORATION CONTINUUM 
 
The Continuum provides a description of the various stages in which a 
Nonprofit and For-profit may collaborate.  Each step on the Continuum 
lends itself to being categorized in specific stages with specific identifying 
characteristics, and each stage along the Continuum relates to increasing 
engagement between the Nonprofit and For-profit.46  James Austin in The 
Collaboration Challenge has identified the Continuum as having three 
specific stages identified below: “[t]he characteristics ascribed to each 
stage appear in gradations as a multifaceted relationship evolves 
incrementally from one stage into another.”47  The deeper the engagement, 
the more important the Collaboration becomes to the collaborating entities, 
from “peripheral to strategic” as the resources devoted to the Collaboration 
 
 40. Young & Salamon, supra note 5, at 441. 
 41. The forms of cross-sector relationship that a Nonprofit considers will all, most likely, be 
revenue enhancing.  Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 2, at 69. 
 42. Id. at 96. 
 43. Young & Salamon, supra note 5, at 423. 
 44. Estelle James, Commercialism and the Mission of Nonprofits, 40 SOC. J. 29, 29 (2003).  Also 
stating that “Nonprofits and For-profits compete with each other in a number of key industries, 
including some cases where For-profits are moving into traditional Nonprofit areas.”  Id. 
 45. Allan Maram, Commentary, Commercialization of the Nonprofit Sector: A Discussion and 
Critical Analysis, SOC. & PUB. POLICY REVIEW 1, 1 (2004). 
 46. As James E. Austin described in The Collaboration Challenge, the cross sector interaction 
tends to follow a specific collaboration continuum wherein each stage of the continuum has specific 
identifying characteristics.  AUSTIN, supra note 5, at 20, 34.  The three stages in the continuum are 
philanthropic stage, transactional stage, and integrative stage.  Id. 
 47. AUSTIN, supra note 5, at 35. 
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by each entity and risk of loss increase.48  Similarly the value of the 
Collaboration to each organization increases from incidental to strategic.49  
Importantly, the more a Nonprofit or For-profit has at stake in the 
Collaboration, the more the Board and Others should be involved to 
effectuate their fiduciary duties.  Considering the cross-sector 
Collaboration relationship in the perspective of this Continuum can help to 
organize the analysis in light of the duty of care in Collaboration 
governance. 
 
1.  The Philanthropic Stage 
 
The Continuum identified by James Austin in The Collaboration 
Challenge starts with the philanthropic stage which is the stage on the 
Continuum that most cross-sector Collaborations achieve.50  In this stage 
the For-profit corporation provides a charitable donation, and the Nonprofit 
is the recipient.51  Early on, in the Austin philanthropic stage,52 for instance, 
each side will benefit modestly53 and potentially have an equally modest 
risk.  The collaborating entities at this stage of the Continuum are very 
reserved in terms of corporate resources allocated to the Collaboration and 
interaction between the For-profit and Nonprofit.54  This may be called the 
“Delivery and Receipt Form.”  The For-profit corporation delivers goods or 
services received by the Nonprofit, and the Nonprofit, by the association, 
delivers reputation to be received by the For-profit.55  Nevertheless, often 
with these Collaborations at the philanthropic stage the Board and Others 
are not involved.56  “Such low-level engagements between Nonprofits and 
companies are commonplace and often long standing, their mutual benefits 
real and not insignificant.”57 
 
2.  The Transactional Stage 
 
The next stage on the Continuum is the transactional stage in which 
“organizations carry out their resource exchanges through specific 
 
 48. AUSTIN, supra note 5, at 34. 
 49. Id. 
 50. AUSTIN, supra note 5, at 20. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 87 (stating “The Nonprofit increases funding; the company enhances its reputation as a 
community supporter.”) (alteration in original). 
 54. Id. at 21–22 (stating “Few individuals and none of the top leadership were involved.”  
Describing the simple “benefit equation” between City Year and Timberland at the outset of their 
collaboration, including that “traditional mind-sets constrained the relationship”). 
 55. This Delivery and Receipt Form may involve other players as well, such as a provider of 
transport and the government, if regulations apply. 
 56. AUSTIN, supra note 5, at 21–22. 
 57. Id. at 22. 
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activities, such as cause-related marketing, event sponsorships, licensing, 
and paid service arrangements.”58  In the case of cause-related marketing 
and event sponsorship, this type of Collaboration usually represents the 
initial form of Collaboration between the entities skipping the philanthropic 
stage.59  At the transactional stage, the Collaboration is mutually beneficial 
for the parties.  The parties seek and identify benefits and, thereby, 
establish a two-way benefit flow.60  Each of the entities is more engaged in 
the activity of the Collaboration that, generally, leads to increased value to 
each organization in the results.61  The For-profit will start to see more 
direct benefits to its business operations.62  “Although collaboration in the 
transactional stage may focus on the deal between the partners and involve 
sharply circumscribed transactions such as those just listed, often it 
includes other important resource exchanges as well.”63  This stage 
involves the exchange of expertise between the collaborators.  “Interaction 
between the partners broadens and intensifies.  Strategic fit becomes closer.  
The complexity of the alliance grows, and the nature and magnitude of the 
benefits also multiply.”64  In this stage, it is important for the collaborators 
to pursue opportunities that increase the possibilities for each collaborator 
to understand the other side’s vision and goals.  Through understanding 
each other’s vision and goals, each collaborator can realize there might be a 
real connection.  “The cornerstone for building a richer value exchange is 
the identification of overlapping missions and compatible values.”65 
 
3.  The Integrative Stage 
 
Characteristics of the integrative stage are when the collaborators’ 
missions, people and activities benefit from more “collective action and 
organizational integration.”66  At this stage, the Collaboration takes on 
characteristics that resemble more and more a “highly integrated joint 
venture,” and the Collaboration becomes more integral to the strategy and 
 
 58. AUSTIN, supra note 5, at 22. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 24 (indicating that the Chief Operating Officer at Timberland described this stage of the 
collaboration with City Year as “commercial” since “it is analogous to a buyer-seller relationships 
dominated by the parties’ search for specific value transactions.”). 
 61. Id. at 22. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 23 (indicating that this is particularly true when the collaboration has evolved from the 
philanthropic stage.).  For example “[c]ompany employee volunteer programs often emerge as 
extensions of financial donations made to Nonprofits in the philanthropic stage of an alliance, and this 
involvement of company personnel begins to generate many of the employee motivational and 
developmental benefits . . . .”  Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 24. 
 66. Id. at 26. 
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functioning of each individual collaborator.67  In this form, the type of 
resource exchange intensifies in value and the amount of exchange 
increases.68  The interaction between personnel from each collaborator 
becomes more frequent and involved.69  In the prior stages, the 
Collaboration created value for each collaborator.  This continues in the 
integrative stage, but also the element of joint-value becomes part of the 
mix.70  The Collaboration creates joint-value to the collaborators such that 
the value is contingent upon the survival of the Collaboration.  “[E]ach 
organization’s culture is affected by the other’s; processes and procedures 
are instituted to manage the growing complexity of the relationship.  
Ultimately, the alliance becomes institutionalized.”71  Along with this stage 
and collaboration comes an “ever-widening set of personal and 
organizational connections.”72  “Relatively few nonprofits and companies 
have advanced to this degree of integration, but those farsighted partners 
that have are reaping what they perceive to be significant benefits.”73 
 
III.  THE DUTY OF CARE IN COLLABORATION-RELATED 
GOVERNANCE 
 
As stated earlier, there are great differences between For-profits and 
Nonprofits.  It is important to keep in mind the primary mission for each 
organization: For-profit businesses are organized and operated for the 
 
 67. AUSTIN, supra note 5, at 26. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. (indicating that the Chief Operating Officer of Timberland described this stage of the 
collaboration continuum as “mutual mission relationship” with boundaries).  “It’s not them and us.  It’s 
just we are us and they are them and we are together us, too.”  Id. at 26–27. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 27.  Describing the Starbucks/CARE collaboration, Austin writes: 
[a]s more Starbucks executives and staff became involved in CARE activities and 
some CARE staff spent time in Starbucks, the organizations’ values and missions 
became more entwined, and joint learning and value creation increased.  This is 
indicative of a relationship that is moving beyond traditional philanthropy to the 
transactional stage of two-way benefit flows and then to the stage of organizational 
integration, in which people from each organization become more deeply engaged in 
issues critical to the other. 
Id. at 31.  “The benefits of an integrative relationship are attended by additional challenges.  As the 
nature of The Nature Conservancy-Georgia- Pacific relationship has changed with its progression along 
the Collaboration Continuum, both organizations have had to relinquish increasing amounts of control, 
which has posed a threat to each along the way.”  Id. at 33 (Explaining that the Georgia-Pacific senior 
communications manager stated “There was concern at Georgia-Pacific about locking ourselves into 
something that would be bad for shareholders.”  Meanwhile the president of The Nature Conservancy 
explained “We value our reputation.  If we tarnish it in a partnership, we jeopardize our membership 
support and our revenues.”  As Austin explained, “[a]s the partnership has intensified and the once-
separate reputations of the partners have become more closely aligned, each organization has also had 
to give up some degree of control over its image and brand.”). 
 73. Id. at 26. 
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pursuit of profit and gains to the shareholders, the Nonprofits are organized 
and operated in pursuit of its philanthropic mission.74  Despite these 
differences, however, there are parallels, including the responsibilities of 
each organization’s Board and Others to ensure the proper care of the 
organization.75  In general, in recent years with several instances of For-
profit and Nonprofit corporate malfeasance drawing the attention of the 
public and regulators, the duties of the Board and Others have received 
heightened attention.76  In particular, governments adopted significantly 
more onerous governance requirements and brought more enforcement 
actions to thwart the perceived improper, if not illegal, behavior of business 
management.77 
Responsibility for governance rests with the Board and Others, those 
with the fiduciary duty.78  The corresponding duties require that an 
organization establish rules, systems, and business practices that ensure the 
transparency, accountability and fairness of the entity’s business dealings.79  
The Board of both types of organizations is charged with responsibility for 
management of the organization.80  As such, they should be guided by the 
similar basic fiduciary principles of the duties of loyalty and care.81  The 
duty of care on a basic level requires the person with the duty to act in an 
“informed and deliberate manner”82 as an “ordinarily prudent person” 
 
 74. Vachon, supra note 35, at 37. 
 75. Some state statues provide limited liability for officers, directors, and other persons serving 
nonprofit entities without compensation.  See e.g., 805 Ill. Comp. Stat. 105/108.70 (2010). 
 76. Chris Cornforth, Introduction: The Changing Context of Governance—Emerging Issues and 
Paradoxes, in THE GOVERNANCE OF PUBLIC AND NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: WHAT DO BOARDS 
DO? 1, 4 (Chris Cornforth ed. 2003) [hereinafter Cornforth].  See also Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 
2, at 72–73 (“In the meantime, with scandals like the United Way of America and the recent Red Cross 
embarrassment in New York City, attention has been focused on nonprofit efficiency and 
accountability.”).  See Danne L. Johnson, Seeking Meaningful Nonprofit Reform in a Post Sarbanes-
Oxley World 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 187, 217–18 (2009) (indicating that the For-profit malfeasance 
received more attention than Nonprofit malfeasance most likely due to the link between “management 
malfeasance and individual harm” and the individual harmed with Nonprofit malfeasance in not the 
investor but the beneficiary of the Nonprofit’s mission).  But see Karen Donnelly, Good Governance: 
Has the IRS Usurped the Business Judgment of Tax-Exempt Organizations in the Name of 
Transparency and Accountability?, 79 UMKC L. REV. 163, 165 (2010) (stating “Arguably, the public 
responded to the tainted industry of good deeds with more disdain and scrutiny than to the corporate 
scandals because of the public trust in the nonprofit sector.”). 
 77. Cornforth, supra note 76, at 5.  See also Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 2, at 72–73 (“In the 
meantime, with scandals like the United Way of America and the recent Red Cross embarrassment in 
New York City, attention has been focused on nonprofit efficiency and accountability.”). 
 78. Vachon, supra note 35, at 45–46. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Johnson, supra note 24, at 196–97. 
 81. Id.  “Courts apply the duty of care in cases involving alleged negligence, mismanagement, or 
intentional decisions to commit unlawful acts.  Cases involving fraud, self-dealing, and conflicts of 
interest are covered under the duty of loyalty.”  3 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
LAW OF CORP. § 837.60 (2011). 
 82. Lou R. King & Eileen T. Nugent, Corporate Law Aspects of Acquisitions, in 1 NEGOTIATED 
ACQUISITIONS OF COMPANIES, SUBSIDIARIES AND DIVISIONS 44–45 (2011).  See also FLETCHER, supra 
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would.83  The duty of care applies to the decision making and oversight 
responsibilities of the directors on the Board.84  In the seminal case about 
the duty of care, the Aronson court held “[D]irectors have a duty to inform 
themselves, prior to making a business decision, of all material information 
reasonably available to them. Having become so informed, they must then 
act with requisite care in the discharge of their duties.”85  The Board 
exercises its oversight function by authorizing agents, officers and 
employees to perform corporate functions on behalf of the Board.86  As the 
Board’s role tends to be more passive, it corresponds more to the duty of 
care’s oversight management than regular decision making.87  In order to 
ensure that it conducts proper and adequate passive management through 
oversight, the directors should verify that 1) the corporate management 
team can perform the necessary tasks and responsibility, 2) there are 
systems in place through which the Board can monitor and oversee the 
performance of the corporate management team, and 3) the Board must 
respond to protect the interests of the corporation if there are signs that 
corporate management is not fulfilling its responsibilities.88  The necessity 
for this evaluation increases the further along the Continuum. 
Early on in the Continuum, at the philanthropic stage, as stated earlier, 
the Board and Others are not very involved, if at all.89  But as the 
Collaboration continues to develop, and depending on the form of 
Collaboration, the Board and Others will need to become more involved.90  
They will need to evaluate the impact the Collaboration will have on the 
company and whether it is in the best interest of the company.  This 
evaluation differs greatly when considering the primary representation that 
the Board and Others performs for each collaborator.  For a For-profit, the 
traditional approach would be that the Board and Others would represent 
the shareholders, individuals invested in financial return.  This approach 
may be modified to account for stakeholders as well.  For a Nonprofit, the 
Board and Others do not have shareholders to represent.  Instead, the Board  
 
note 81, at § 4.02. 
Whether by statute or common law, every state imposes on directors and officers a duty 
of care to their corporations.  This duty is tempered, however, by judicial reluctance to 
second guess the business decisions of corporate management.  Courts generally focus 
on whether the director took reasonable care to make an informed judgment rather than 
on whether the judgment itself was reasonable. 
Id. at § 4.02. 
 83. FLETCHER, supra note 81, at § 1032 (discussing the various standards of conduct and 
indicating that the “ordinarily prudent person” standard is the majority). 
 84. 6 IOWA PRAC. BUS. ORGS. § 28:4 (2010). 
 85. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
 86. IOWA PRAC., supra note 84. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. AUSTIN, supra note 5, at 20. 
 90. Id. at 60, 77, 85. 
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and Others represent the corporate mission and the stakeholders, including 
the public. 
As part of the analysis to determine if the duty of care has been 
fulfilled along the various stages of the Continuum, the court may need to 
analyze the conduct under the business judgment rule.  The business 
judgment rule is designed to ensure that the Board and Others have plenty 
of opportunity to sufficiently exercise their power to manage the business 
affairs of the organization pursuant to the powers granted to them under the 
relevant statutes.91  The business judgment rule provides protection to the 
decision maker and the decision.92  The decision, however, had to have 
been made in good faith and with proper care.93  Pursuant to the business 
judgment rule, liability will not attach if a decision was made in good faith 
and the decision maker was a) disinterested (i.e., no conflicts or self-
dealing), b) reasonably informed about the circumstances relevant to the 
situation and c) rationally believed the decision to be made in the best 
interests of the organization.94  If these standards are met, a court will 
generally not question a decision unless clearly made irrationally.95  
Essentially, actual business judgment must have been made.96  A director 
must perform reasonable diligence in order to be able to exercise business 
judgment.97  This includes a director informing himself of “all the material 
information reasonably available to [him]” before making the business 
 
 91. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 
A.2d 779, 782 (Del. 1981). 
 92.  Olsen provides as follows: 
If the sole issue is whether the director breached the duty of care, the courts defer to the 
director’s judgment and generally will not impose liability unless the director clearly did 
not analyze and evaluate a proposed action before approving it.  The courts employ a 
presumption of propriety with respect to director actions.  This presumption is sometimes 
referred to as the “Business Judgment Rule.”  The “Business Judgment Rule” will not 
protect a director where there is a conflict of interest, fraud, oppression or corruption. 
BRENT A. OLSON ET AL., CAL. BUS. LAW DESKBOOK § 2:17 (2010).  See also FLETCHER, supra note 
81, at § 837.60. 
 93. JOHNSON, supra note 24, at 187, 197. 
 94. See, e.g., Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 54 (Del. 1989); 
Michael W. Peregrine & James R. Schwartz, The Business Judgment Rule and Other Protections for 
Conduct of Not-for-Profit Directors, 33 J. HEALTH L. 422, 466 (2000). 
 95. Aronson, 473 A.2d 805, 812–13 (Del. 1984) (finding that the rule “is a presumption that in 
making a business decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and 
in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.”); Peregrine & 
Schwartz, supra note 94, at 466 (stating that “While the Rule ‘is not easily transposed to the nonprofit 
context,’ the drafters of the Revised Model Act, several courts, and a number of observers have all 
supported such applications.”). 
 96. See Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971) (stating that “Application of 
the [business judgment] rule of necessity depends upon a showing that informed directors did in fact 
make a business judgment authorizing the transaction under review.”). 
 97. See e.g., Burt v. Irvine Co., 47 Cal. Rptr. 392, 408 (1st Dist. 1965); Casey v. Woodruff, 49 
NY.S.2d 625, 643 (N.Y. 1944). 
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decision.98  As a result, the director cannot ignore what is going on with the 
organization, including Collaboration activities.99  Accordingly, in order to 
find that the business judgment rule does not apply, in some jurisdictions, a 
claimant must rebut the presumption that the decision was an informed 
decision and establish that the director acted in bad faith.100  In the seminal 
case, Smith v. Van Gorkom, the court held that the standard to determine 
director’s liability requires a showing of gross negligence under the 
business judgment rule.101 
Starting immediately, before the philanthropic stage, as the two 
different types of organizations search out or engage with potential 
Collaboration partners to exercise their duty of care, the Board and Others 
must inform themselves and reasonably believe the potential collaborator is 
the best fit.102  If management is not involved, as has been suggested in the 
philanthropic stage,103  the lack of involvement of management indicates, 
among other things, the perceived value to the collaborator as well as the 
perceived risk.104  The determination of best fit involves creating a strategy, 
a meshing of corporate cultures, and determining if both organizations will 
benefit.105  This analysis should be done individually by each organization, 
while considering the culture, goals and values of the other organization in 
the cross-sector Collaboration.  For if the goals and values of the other 
organization cannot be met, the Collaboration will not succeed.  It is 
important, therefore, for each organization to determine whether it will be 
able to, in the Collaboration, 1) meet and uphold its goals and values and 2) 
meet and uphold the goals and values of the other organization, without 
encountering risks it cannot manage.  Even at the first step in the 
philanthropic stage, the two entities need to consider the form of their 
interactions and where they plan to take the interactions as their 
Collaboration evolves.106 
 
 
 98. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d at 872 (citing Kaplan, 284 A.2d at 119). 
 99. Id. 
 100. In re Walt Disney Derivative Litigation, 907 A.2d 693, 746-48 (Del. Ch. 2006).  See also Van 
Gorkum, 488 A.2d. at 872; Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. 
 101. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873 (citing Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812). 
 102. Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 2 at 97. 
 103. AUSTIN, supra note 5 at 90 and 92. 
 104. Austin & Reficco, supra note 1, at 87 (indicating that the process requires management to 
advocate it). 
 105. Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 2, at 97. 
 106. Austin & Reficco, supra note 1, at 87 (stating that incorporating concepts like social 
responsibility into the business process of a For-profit requires that the top management advocate the 
change and starts with a “power vision” and “why it is vital to the organization’s success”); Gary H. 
Moore, Joint Ownership of Intellectual Property: Issues and Pitfalls, in STRUCTURING, NEGOTIATING, 
AND IMPLEMENTING STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 215, 220–21 (PLI Corp. Law Practice, Course Handbook 
Ser. No. 1132, 199) (stating that if there is collaboratively created intellectual property it should be 
considered early on and incorporated into the agreements drafted for the collaborative venture). 
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IV.  FOR-PROFIT’S DUTY OF CARE 
AND THE COLLABORATION 
 
Corporations have grown immensely powerful.  Three hundred 
multinational corporations control roughly a quarter of the world’s wealth.  
Their managers frequently make decisions that run counter to the long-term 
interests of the public and even their own shareholders, as the recent 
financial crisis has illustrated.  Some view these derelictions as an 
unavoidable consequence of the corporate legal structure. 107 
Integrating the Collaboration into the For-profit’s agenda can be a 
great challenge for the Board and Others due to the fact that the traditional 
role of a For-profit Board and Others is to represent the shareholders and 
ensure profitability of the company, thereby guaranteeing a return on the 
shareholders’ investment.  Translated, the bottom line for the company 
represents the mission of the For-profit company, possibly to the exclusion 
of the interests of stakeholders.108  “Stakeholders are those being defined as 
groups who are significantly affected by company actions and who can in 
turn impact the company.”109  The embodiment of this approach can be 
found with Milton Friedman who was quoted as saying that the “social 
responsibility of business is to increase profits.”110 
When other factors come into play, such as stakeholders and 
philanthropy, the waters become clouded111 because, traditionally, business 
and philanthropy are separate paths in the For-profit world.112  Concern for 
social responsibility on the part of the company might impair the pursuit of 
 
 107. DAVID BORNSTEIN & SUSAN DAVIS, SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP 4 (2010) (For example, in 
this book The Corporation, law professor Joel Bakan argues that while a corporation enjoys the legal 
status of a person, it is free of the social and legal forces that ensure good behavior from real people, 
such as empathy, public disapproval, and the threat of imprisonment.  “Unlike the human beings who 
inhabit it,” he writes, “the corporation is singularly self-interested and unable to feel genuine concern 
for others in any context.”). 
 108. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970; Weeks, 
supra note 7, at 320.  HAROLD L. JOHNSON, DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE SOCIAL PERFORMANCE: 
SURVEY, EVALUATION, AND PROSPECTS 9 (1979) (“According to the traditional framework, the 
enterprise is concentrated in the role and goals of the entrepreneur who contracts with owners of 
various inputs for their services and commodities into a production process.  The objective function of 
the firm is solely that of the entrepreneur who, particularly in competitive markets, is motivated by a 
singled-minded focus on profits.  Owners of inputs are said to take up the purpose of the entrepreneur 
as part of a contractual quid pro quo, for it is the entrepreneur’s commercial venture, not theirs.  If 
workers dislike their jobs, if consumers are dissatisfied with the quality or safety of products, or if 
consumers are dissatisfied with the quality or safety of products, or if dealers are outraged by arbitrary 
treatment—they vote with their feet, departing the relationship in search of greener pastures.”). 
 109. Austin & Reficco, supra note 1, at 90. 
 110. Friedman, supra note 108. 
 111. Cornforth, supra note 76, at 7. 
 112. Austin & Reficco, supra note 1, at 86–87 (indicating that a national U.S. study (Center for 
Corporate Citizenship 2004) determined that most for-profits have not been able to integrate corporate 
social responsibility into their organizations significantly).  Dees, supra note 4, at 9. 
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profit maximization, which would arguably be a breach of the duty of care 
to the For-profit.113  In this model, the Board and Others serve as agents to 
the For-profit, essentially the For-profit’s owners, the shareholders and, 
therefore, their duty of care centers on fulfilling the goals of the 
shareholders.114 
Consequently, the argument is that the Board and Others have a duty 
to ensure and pursue profit maximization.  This controversy can be seen as 
premised on the actual perception of how the For-profit, through its 
operations, links with the outside world.115  Those advocating for profit 
maximization exclusively, excluding philanthropy, do not generally 
recognize that the economic context of the For-profit is necessarily 
connected with the social context outside of the organization.116  
Traditionally, courts upheld the shareholder’s primacy, and that remains 
the majority today.117  In 1919, the court in the leading case of Dodge v. 
Ford Motor Co. held that a For-profit “is organized and carried on 
primarily for the profit of the stockholders.”118  Almost forty years later, the 
A.P. Smith Manufacturing Co. court held that charitable giving was not a 
waste of corporate assets and that shareholder primacy “ought not to be 
permitted . . . to thwart the long-visioned corporate action in recognizing 
and voluntarily discharging its high obligations as a constituent of our 
modern social structure.”119  The A.P. Smith Manufacturing Co. decision 
applied the business judgment rule to hold that corporate giving was a 
“lawful exercise of the corporation’s implied and incidental powers under 
common-law principles.”120  Historically, this seems to be the start of the 
shareholder versus stakeholder debate.  Today, however, shareholder 
primacy is still the norm in many jurisdictions,121 but the For-profit 
organization may look for ways to be more philanthropic, moving from 
purely donating to a deeper involvement, along the Continuum.122 
 
 
 113. Weeks, supra note 7, at 320. 
 114. But see Cornforth, supra note 76, at 7–8.  According to the agency theory of compliance (the 
most frequently used theory in corporate governance), management acts for the interests of themselves 
rather than the shareholders or mission.  Arguably the duty of loyalty and good faith may be implicated 
as well. 
 115. JOHNSON, supra note 24, at 4. 
 116. “Proponents of the philanthropic use of enterprise point out that social and economic issues are 
inextricably intertwined.”  Dees, supra note 3, at 3 (indicating that to create sustainable solutions to 
social problems people would be wise to use business methods and market-oriented approaches as a 
part of their overall approach but not every social problem will respond to market-based solutions or 
business methods). 
 117. Springer, supra note 18, at 87. 
 118. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 681 (Mich. 1919). 
 119. A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 590 (N.J. 1953). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Springer, supra note 18, at 97. 
 122. Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 2, at 96; Minow, supra note 24, at 1066. 
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On the other hand, the new atmosphere encourages a modified 
approach to business for the For-profits by emphasizing For-profit’s 
conduct effects on others over profits.123  Recent years have witnessed 
greater and greater integration of social responsibility into the For-profit 
business model such that it has become more the norm in business but not 
necessarily in law.124  Shifted perspectives of the corporation and modified 
law encourage For-profits’ Board and Others to consider stakeholders 
when effectuating their fiduciary duties.  State constituency statutes have, 
to a certain extent, codified these efforts to allow For-profits to pursue 
philanthropy.125  Thus, when making business decisions and plans, 
management should no longer only consider the bottom-line but also 
philanthropy.126 
The duty of care standard emphasizes that the Board and Others must 
inform themselves and exercise the decision making and oversight 
functions over the Collaboration as an “ordinarily prudent person” would at 
that stage on the Continuum, recognizing that shareholder and stakeholder 
theories compete but may not be preclusive.  Making the decision to 
engage or stay in the Collaboration, the Board and Others, taking a 
conservative approach to exercising their duty of care, would evaluate 
whether, in fact, social philanthropy of the Collaboration can build 
goodwill for the For-profit and, thereby, contribute to the bottom line when 
consumers gravitate towards the more philanthropic organization.127  
Through this approach the For-profit organization may hope to increase its 
reservoir of goodwill, develop additional business,128 and take ameliorative 
 
 123. Mitchell, supra note 19, at 502 (arguing that the laws of the state have severely limited the 
corporation to pursue stakeholder interests and philanthropy). 
 124. Austin & Reficco, supra note 1, at 90.  See also, Springer supra note 18, at 87. 
 125. See the constituency statutes of each state such as DEL. CODE ANN., Tit. 8, § 122(9) (giving the 
Delaware corporation the power to “make donations for the public welfare or for charitable, scientific 
or educational purposes….”); see also N.J. STATE. ANN. § 14A:3–4 (2011) (“(1) Any corporation 
organized for any purpose under any general or special law of this State, unless otherwise provided in 
its certificate of incorporation or by-laws, shall have power, irrespective of corporate benefit, to aid, 
singly or in cooperation with other corporations and with natural persons, in the creation or 
maintenance of institutions or organizations engaged in community fund, hospital, charitable, 
philanthropic, educational, scientific or benevolent activities or patriotic or civic activities conducive to 
the betterment of social and economic conditions, and the board may authorize the making of 
contributions for those purposes in money, securities, including shares of the corporation, or other 
property, in such reasonable amounts as the board may determine; provided, that a contribution shall 
not be authorized hereunder if at the time of the contribution or immediately thereafter the done 
institution shall own more than 10% of the voting stock of the donor corporation or one of its 
subsidiaries. (2) The provisions of this section shall not be construed as directly or indirectly 
minimizing or interpreting the rights and powers of corporations, as heretofore existing, with reference 
to appropriations, expenditures or contributions of the nature above specified.”). 
 126. Weeks, supra note 7, at 320–21. 
 127. Michael N. Glanz, Introduction to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), IN DOING BUSINESS 
ABROAD 229, 232 (2009). 
 128. Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 2, at 96 (referring to the specific example of Ben & Jerry’s 
Partnership Program that granted franchises for the sale of ice cream to community-based social 
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steps to counter corporate scandal or bad publicity.129  This conservative 
approach treats the Collaboration as another effort to increase the bottom 
line and to improve on shareholder interest; therefore it supports the 
already fundamental duty of care owed to the organization. 
Clearly, the decision to allocate resources to the Collaboration has 
varying implications at various stages along the Continuum.  The more the 
Collaboration diverts from the bottom-line pursuits of the For-profit, the 
more important the Board and Others are to the actual decision to be 
involved in the Collaboration or stay involved.  At the philanthropic stage, 
where there is “Delivery and Receipt,” the Board and Others may be 
justified in taking a more hands off approach.  The transactional and 
integrative stages, by their nature, trigger the duty of care given the 
allocation of resources and potential risk at those stages.  Under the first 
approach, the Board and Others can more easily justify the Collaboration 
because the For-profit’s bottom line is greatly influenced by its public 
image and the Collaboration would be intended to improve that image.130  
Improved image means the increased chance for more business which in 
turn benefits shareholders.  Arguably, the Collaboration would be another 
method to improve profits similar to what an advertising campaign is 
intended to achieve.  Engaging in cause-related marketing, for example, 
may not even be written off as corporate giving or community relations in 
corporate accounting.  Instead, it may come right out of the corporation’s 
budget for marketing.131 
A less conservative approach finds the Collaboration as augmenting 
the mission of the corporation from a corporate mission of maximizing 
profits and returns to investors, to a mission of optimizing returns to 
stakeholders.132  This approach modifies the duty of care by adding the 
stakeholder to the mix.  The underlying concept asserted by the Board and 
Others would be that through the Collaboration the For-profit is serving a 
broader constituency which will improve the company’s sustainability.  
Through this means, the company would produce both economic and social 
value, which some have referred to as “blended value.”133  Arguably, this 
second approach is a greater challenge for the Board and Others to validate 
as consistent with the duty of care.134  “In this approach organizations’ 
social value creation is not treated as something separate or peripheral.  On  
 
 
services Nonprofit organizations.  Through this process the Nonprofit gains experience and knowledge 
on how to run a business and, in turn, Ben & Jerry’s gains advertising.). 
 129. Minow, supra note 24, at 1066. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Andreasen, supra note 11, at 48. 
 132. Austin & Reficco, supra note 1, at 90. 
 133. Id. 
 134. The duty of loyalty may also be implicated. 
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the contrary, it is imbedded in a larger and transparent accountability 
system that reports to the internal and external stakeholders.”135 
To help the Board and Others exercise the duty of care, they should 
consider: 1) What does the For-profit intend to gain from the 
Collaboration?  2) Does the bottom line of the For-profit stand to benefit 
from the Collaboration and to what degree?  3) At what point on the 
Continuum will the Collaboration start and where do the collaborating 
entities intend that it should go?  4)  What are the risks to the For-profit of 
the Collaboration, which will be influenced by the stage on the Continuum 
and the evaluated strength of the collaborating Nonprofit? and 5) Are the 
risks of the Collaboration worth the intended result, including whether the 
Board and Others determine if there is an obligation to ensure the 
sustainability of the Nonprofit in the Collaboration pursuant to Section III. 
C. below?  Similar to venture philanthropy, corporate philanthropy requires 
the For-profit Board and Others to determine “what measures of social 
return it is looking for.”136  Generally, there are a few instances when social 
and economic returns are correlated, i.e., they are synchronized.137  In many 
cases, however, they do not.138  If there is an economic return for the 
philanthropic efforts, it is usually not in time.  Ethically, as the 
Collaboration proceeds along the collaboration Continuum with investment 
by both collaborating companies, it is important for the For-profit Board 
and Others to determine whether it is collaborating with an exit strategy in 
mind or with loyalty to staying in the Collaboration.  As early as possible, 
the For-profit company should reach this determination for its own 
corporate governance purposes, and ethically given the impact of its 
decision on the collaborating Nonprofit.  This should be translated in the 
business plan.  If the Board and Others (ultimately the Board) decide to 
pursue a social and not an economic return, then loyalty to the program 
rather than an exit strategy may be its better focus of time and funds.139 
 
V.  NONPROFIT DUTY OF CARE AND THE COLLABORATION 
 
For a Nonprofit, “[t]he biggest challenge is keeping focused on key 
goals; developing a strategy for accomplishing them; and generating a set 
of tactics, operations, and actions that are aligned with producing them.”140 
 
 
 135. Austin & Reficco, supra note 1, at 90. 
 136. Roger Thompson, The Coming Transformation of Social Enterprise Q&A with: V. Kasturi 
Rangan, HARV. BUS. SCH. (2008) (responding to a query about the state of venture philanthropy). 
 137. Id. at 1. 
 138. Id. at 2. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Sean Silverthorne, Achieving Excellence in Nonprofits Q&A with: Herman B. Leonard, HARV. 
BUS. SCH. (Oct. 27, 2008), http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/5942.html. 
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Like their For-profit counterparts, Nonprofits also have experienced a 
heightened level of scrutiny for reasons including their move into 
commercialism.141  In addition, it has been uncovered recently that many 
Nonprofits did not adequately incorporate corporate governance 
requirements.142  The governance law applicable to Nonprofits is really 
underdeveloped compared to the law of For-profits.143  Recently, the 
Internal Revenue Service ( “IRS”) has been among the leaders in Nonprofit 
governance reform, relying principally on public disclosure as a tool.144 
The IRS’ 2008 position paper concerning governance and, in 
particular, the 501(c)(3) tax-exempt Nonprofit, states: 
[the IRS does] not require charities to have governance and 
management policies [but that it] will review an organization’s 
application for exemption and annual information returns to determine 
whether the organization has implemented policies relating to 
executive compensation, conflicts of interest, investments, fundraising, 
documenting governance decisions, document retention and 
 
 141. See ABA COORDINATING COMMITTEE ON NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE, GUIDE TO NONPROFIT 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE WAKE OF SARBANES-OXLEY v-vii (2005). See also Heather Gottry, 
Profit or Perish: Non-Profit Social Service Organizations & Social Entrepreneurship, 6 GEO. J. ON 
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 249, 249–50 (1999) (indicating that scandals such as with Jim Bakker, Pat 
Robertson and United Way of America have also contributed to the scrutiny); Lisa A. Runquist & 
Michael E. Malamut, The IRS’s New Regulation of Nonprofit Governance,18 BUS. L. TODAY 29, 29 
(2009) (“In light of the Enron debacle and parallel scandals in the Nonprofit world, Congress and the 
IRS have put Nonprofits, and specifically Nonprofit governance, under the microscope.  Sarbanes-
Oxley (SOX) instituted federal corporate governance oversight of public companies.”). 
 142. Richard Wallace, Nonprofit Corporate Governance: Playing the Game by the Rules, 
ALICEBOT (Oct. 1, 2002).  For example, the Nonprofits maintained many directors in management 
positions. Towards this end, a goal of corporate governance for both the Nonprofit and For-profit 
companies is to achieve a board of directors that is primarily independent of the company and can guide 
the Nonprofit ethically and legally.  A director that is also company management is not independent and 
represents a source of conflict. 
 143. Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 500 
(1981). 
 144. Runquist, supra note 141, at 30, 33. See also INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, GOVERNANCE 
AND RELATED TOPICS – 501(C)(3) ORGANIZATIONS. § 4, (2008), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/ 
governance_practices.pdf.   Peregrine, supra note 34, at §43:44 (“The Position Paper is structured as a 
discussion of six specific governance topics: (i) Mission; (ii) Organizational Documents; (iii) 
Governing Body; (iv) Governance and Management Policies; (v) Financial Statements and Form 990 
Reporting; and (vi) Transparency.  The discussion reflects governance themes from both the several 
public speeches of recent months by IRS Commissioner Steven Miller, as well as those from Parts VI 
and XI from the new Form 990 for fiscal year 2008.  In this way, the Position Paper significantly 
updates and expands upon the February 2007 discussion draft of “Good Governance Practices” for 
charitable organizations, which has now been withdrawn from the IRS web site.”).  See also INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERVICE, FORM NO. 990, RETURN OF ORGANIZATION EXEMPT FROM INCOME TAX, (2010), 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trge/governance_practices.pdf.  If required to file the Form 990, a Nonprofit 
Organization will need to file it annually with the IRS.  Many states also require an annual filing of the 
Form 990 as well.  See also Runquist, supra note 141, at 29.  (“The resulting IRS foray into corporate 
governance is simplistic; neither the form nor the instructions recognize the many problems that may 
result from the revised form.”). 
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destruction, and whistleblower claims.145 
Consequently, the implication is that a properly organized and operated 
Nonprofit will have governance policies for management of the 
organization.146 
Historically, however, state law has primarily regulated Nonprofit 
governance.147 In the area of directors and officers duties and 
responsibilities in a Nonprofit, state Nonprofit laws have been primarily 
modeled off of the state law of For-profits, particularly corporations and 
the Model Business Corporation Act.148  As a result, evaluation of the 
conduct of the Board and Others of a Nonprofit involves reference to a 
standard of fiduciary duties similar to that of a For-profit.149  Since the 
Nonprofit and For-profit are not the same type of organization, however, 
this analysis would be incomplete without considering specific qualities of 
the Nonprofit.150  First, a Nonprofit’s activities are limited to those in 
furtherance of its philanthropic mission.151  Second, a Nonprofit, despite its 
name, is not precluded from generating a profit, but must apply the profit to 
the purpose(s) for which the Nonprofit was organized.152 
In the context of Nonprofits’ governance, the court in the 2008 Health 
Alliance of Greater Cincinnati case found that a fiduciary is a person that 
has a duty to act primarily for the benefit of another.153  This duty is based 
 
 145. See GOVERNANCE AND RELATED TOPICS, supra note 144.  See also FORM 990, supra note 146. 
 146. Vachon, supra note 35, at 44. 
 147. Runquist, supra note 141, at 29. 
 148. Vachon, supra note 35, at 44.  In addition, in the wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 
some states have proposed laws that apply Sarbanes-Oxley-type corporate governance provisions to 
Nonprofit Organizations.  Id.  In terms of state’s general corporations statutes, Delaware law is worthy 
of note for a variety of reasons, including that it has a corporations code that is applied to both for-profit 
and nonprofit corporations.  Id. at 44-45. 
 149. Peregrine, supra note 33, at § 43:3.  (“Litigation is conducted, contracts are executed, and 
money is borrowed all in the name of the nonprofit corporation itself, rather than in the name of 
individual trustees, just as in the case of business corporations.  In addition, adoption by most states of 
the Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act (UPMIFA) confirms the application of 
traditional corporate law principles to financial investment practices of charitable corporations 
(particularly with regard to UPMIFA’s shift away from a ‘legal list’ of approved types of 
investments).”).  Id. 
 150. Vachon, supra note 35, at 39. 
 151. Id.  (“In the United States most Nonprofit Organizations of import are corporations. This 
mission limitation means that the Nonprofit’s business purpose is limited to activities specifically set 
forth in its organizing documentation, namely its charter or Articles of Incorporation.”). 
 152. Vachon, supra note 35, at 39 (“Corporate earnings in excess of expenses are returned to the 
corporation for use in support of the corporate mission.”).  “This “private inurement doctrine” in which 
the Nonprofit Organization’s net earnings may not inure to the benefit of private parties, is central to 
the law governing Nonprofits.  It marks a very clear line between Nonprofits and For-profits.”  Id. 
(citing DANIEL L. KURTZ, BOARD LIABILITY: GUIDE FOR NONPROFIT DIRECTORS 2–3 (1988) 
[hereinafter KURTZ]). 
 153. Health Alliance of Greater Cincinnati v. Christ Hosp., No. C-070426, 2008 WL 4394738, at *6 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2008).  See Vachon, supra note 35, at 46 (discussing this case involving a Nonprofit 
corporation). 
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the person’s efforts for the other and applies to matters related to those 
efforts.154  In the case of a Nonprofit in a cross-sector Collaboration, this 
duty attaches to the individuals of the Board and Others acting for the 
Nonprofit.155  The traditional role of the Board of the Nonprofit is to serve 
as the “guardians of the charity’s mission”.156  Consequently, the decision 
by a Nonprofit to enter into a Collaboration with a For-profit and the 
ongoing involvement in the Collaboration requires careful analysis and 
monitoring to ensure: 1) pursuit of the philanthropic mission and 2) 
application of the profit towards the mission.  This implicates the duty of 
care of the Board and Others.157  The following conduct would help 
towards fulfilling the duty of care, among others: 1) understand their 
fiduciary duties to the organization, 2) continue to be informed about the 
duties and the organization in general, 3) do not take things at face value, 
instead be skeptical and ask questions, and 4) when making decisions and 
applying judgment use complete (undivided) loyalty and care towards the 
organization and if impossible disclose the conflict for approval.158 
In its 2008 Position Paper on Corporate Governance, the IRS 
emphasized the duty of care through its encouragement of “an active and 
engaged board” explaining that “it is important to the success of a charity 
and to its compliance with applicable law.”159  The duty of care applies in 
two identified categories of Nonprofit action: 1) decision making and 2) 
oversight.160  “Decision Making” is when the Board, along with 
management, makes a specific decision or pursues a specific action.161  
“Oversight” is the general responsibility of the Board to oversee the 
management of the day-to-day operations of the Nonprofit. While 
ultimately the Board’s obligation, oversight is shared with the management 
of the Nonprofit. 
The decision-making and oversight aspects of the duty of care are 
relevant first to the Nonprofit’s decision to enter into the Collaboration 
and, second to the ongoing activities of the Nonprofit relevant to the 
Collaboration.162  The further along the Continuum, the more involved the 
Board and Others should be to effectively carry out their duty.163  The 
 
 154. Vachon, supra note 35, at 46. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id.  Cornforth supra note 76, at 7–8. 
 157. Vachon, supra note 35, at 48. 
 158. See PANEL, supra note 34, at 8 (indicating “they should be familiar with the basic rules and 
requirements with which their organization must comply and should secure the necessary legal advice 
and assistance to structure appropriate monitoring and oversight mechanisms.”); Peregrine, supra note 
34, at § 6. 
 159. GOVERNANCE AND RELATED TOPICS, supra note 145, at § 3. 
 160. Peregrine, supra note 33, at § 16. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Vachon, supra note 36, at 52. 
 163. Id. 
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collaborating Nonprofit’s Board and Others need to be vigilant to ensure 
that the commercialization pressures of the Collaboration, and the time and 
activities allocated to the Collaboration at any point along the Continuum 
do not erode and/or erase the Nonprofit’s mission and values.164  Exposure 
to the Collaboration and resulting commercialism may encourage the 
Nonprofit’s board and management to bend to the force of popular will 
instead of firmly pursuing the mission, whether popular or not.165  Along 
the Continuum, the Board and Others needs to consider the risk of the 
Collaboration and whether that risk is worth the ultimate financial, and 
otherwise, benefit to the Nonprofit.166 
To this end, first, when making the decision to enter into the cross-
sector collaboration with the For-profit, the Nonprofit’s Board and Others 
should pursue answers to the following questions, among others, as part of 
the decision making: 1) What does the Nonprofit hope to achieve through 
the Collaboration?  2) What are the details about the For-profit intended for 
the Collaboration?  3)  What stage on the Continuum will the Collaboration 
start with and are there goals for moving further along the Continuum?  4)  
What are the risks of the commercial venture and can the Nonprofit afford 
to take those risks, including mission drift and IRS compliance? 5) What is 
expected of the Nonprofit for the Collaboration and can the Nonprofit 
afford to meet the needs?  6) Does the culture and mission of the Nonprofit 
align with that of the Collaboration and the For-profit in the Collaboration? 
and 7) What is the Collaboration timeline and can the Nonprofit meet 
them?167 
Second, the oversight function of the duty of care relates to the on-
going management of the Nonprofit whilst engaging in Collaboration 
activities.  Oversight requires the directors to make a reasonable inquiry on 
an ongoing basis as the Nonprofit pursues the Collaboration, trying to 
balance pursuit of the Nonprofit’s mission with the need for more funds, or 
the other goals of the Collaboration.168  The Board, ultimately responsible 
 
 164. Tuckman, supra note 14, at 2; Young & Salamon, supra note 5, at 441. See also James, supra 
note 44, at 29 (“So long as the charitable goal of the Nonprofit remains the driving force, such 
commercialization has a positive impact on the finances and long term stability of the organization and 
the sector.”).  But see Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 2, at 86. 
 165. Young & Salamon, supra note 5, at 441. 
 166. Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 2, at 70. 
 167. Id. at 87 (citing four questions identified by Nonprofit consultant and scholar Edward Skloot).  
“However, social service Nonprofit organizations vary dramatically both in their objectives and in how 
they achieve those objectives in their day-to-day operations.  This makes it very difficult to identify one 
or more entrepreneurial strategies that are uniformly appropriate.”  Id. at 88. 
 168. GOVERNANCE AND RELATED TOPICS, supra note 144.  (“Regardless of whether a charity is a 
trust, corporation, unincorporated association, or other type of organization, it must have organizational 
documents that provide the framework for its governance and management.”).  See PANEL, supra note 
34, at 10; Tuckman, supra note 14, at 507.  If the Nonprofit is also a tax-exempt organization, this 
process should also provide a means to ensure that the Nonprofit stays compliant with the IRS 
requirements.  The Nonprofit will be deemed as operating exclusively for the charitable (tax-exempt) 
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for the management of the organization, is also responsible pursuant its 
oversight function (and by implication the Board and Others) to avoid, and 
adequately respond to instances of mission drift evidenced by or caused by 
the mission distortion of the Collaboration.169  They will need to be able to 
recognize and distinguish between the pull of Collaboration 
commercialization that benefits the Nonprofit’s mission and Collaboration 
commercialization that distorts it.170  Distortion would result in mission 
drift.  Mission drift happens if the activities of the Nonprofit no longer 
relate to and/or support substantially the mission of the Nonprofit.171  As 
part of the duty of care, the Board needs to be vigilant to ensure that the 
pull of the Collaboration does not erode and erase the mission and values 
of the Nonprofit.172  Many times mission drift occurs gradually over time 
through the activities of the Collaboration and may be intentional or 
unintentional.173  “Important to keep in mind, however, is that an activity 
that seemingly may be alternative to the purpose of the Nonprofit may 
 
purpose if substantially all of its operations are devoted to the charitable purpose or purposes.  I.R.S. 
Treas. Reg  § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c) (2008).  See GOVERNANCE AND RELATED TOPICS, supra note 145.  See 
also Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 2, at 78 (“If more than an insubstantial amount of the 
[Nonprofit’s] activities are not in furtherance of its exempt purposes, it will not qualify as a charitable 
organization defined in Section 501(c)(3).”).  See, e.g., Federation Pharmacy Servs. Inc. v. Comm’r, 72 
T.C. 687 (1979). 
 169. PANEL, supra note 34, at 13 (“The board must protect the assets of the organization and 
provide oversight to ensure that its financial, human and material resources are used appropriately to 
further the organization’s mission.”).  See also GOVERNANCE AND RELATED TOPICS, supra note 144, at 
§5 (articulating the duty “to ensure that financial resources are used to further charitable purposes and 
that the organization’s funds are appropriately accounted for….”); Peregrine, supra note 33, at §§ 1, 8 
(indicating that directors are responsible directing and overseeing the management of corporate affairs).  
“The core fiduciary duties attributable to such board members; their compliance oversight obligations 
(it being such a crucial aspect of health care); the regulators with primary jurisdiction with respect to 
the exercise of such duties; the concept of corporate governance ‘best practices’ as applied to the not-
for-profit corporation;” “Many mission statements are written in broad, unfocused, and all-
encompassing terms, making it difficult to tell when the activities of a nonprofit are causing it to drift 
away from its intended mission . . . As a result, individual Nonprofits and their boards are largely free 
to judge whether an activity is mission appropriate.”  Id. at § 2. 
 170. James, supra note 44, at 29. 
 171. Cornforth, supra note 76, at 7–8. 
 172. Young & Salamon, supra note 5, at 423.  See James, supra note 44, at 29 ( “So long as the 
charitable goal of the Nonprofit remains the driving force, such commercialization has a positive impact 
on the finances and long term stability of the organization and the sector.”); Tuckman, supra note 14, at 
506.  But see Dees, supra note 3, at 10–11 (“Aligning incentives to assure the creation of intended 
social impact. When philanthropists invest in enterprises, they need to be confident that the incentives 
inherent in the enterprise are aligned with their intended social impact, or that safeguards are in place 
should financial rewards ever threaten to pull the organization away from the desired social impact.”); 
Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 2, at 86. 
 173. Tuckman, supra note 14, at 506. (“It can be intentional, as when a Nonprofit consciously 
decides to redirect its activities in a new direction, when it is influenced to seek a new direction through 
government or donor pressure or it may be unintentional, as when thought is not given to the effects of 
commercial activity and the organization gradually addresses its output of goods and services to a 
different mission over time.”). 
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actually support the mission.”174  Mission drift has to be carefully 
monitored for corporate governance purposes and also because it is often 
challenging to detect.175  Some claim that one of the biggest challenges 
confronting the Nonprofit is mission drift.176  This is particularly relevant 
with regards to a Nonprofit that engages in a Collaboration with a For-
profit particularly as they move along the Continuum towards the 
Integrative Stage. 
Even if the Collaboration is successful, the Nonprofit may still be 
putting itself at great risk.177  For instance, a successful venture with much 
profit may implicate a possible violation of a tax-exempt Nonprofit’s status 
under 501(c)(3).178  At a minimum, succumbing to the pressure from the 
Collaboration commercialization pull that distorts the Nonprofit’s mission 
could result in the questionable ethical and legal status of a Nonprofit 
claiming a mission but not pursuing it.  Further, by benefitting from the 
status of being a Nonprofit (such as tax breaks for a tax-exempt Nonprofit), 
the Nonprofit will be under intense scrutiny to establish how it pursues 
commercialization through Collaboration whereby the Nonprofit company 
achieves a degree of unfair competition over For-profit companies.179  The 
deeper into the Continuum the Collaboration moves, the harder it may be 
for the Board and Others manage the mission drift. 
As part of the analysis to determine if a Nonprofit Board member or 
Others has met his or her duty of care relating to the decision to enter into 
the Collaboration at any point along the Continuum or to stay in the 
Collaboration, the court may need to analyze the conduct under the 
business judgment rule.  A Nonprofit decision maker and the good faith 
decision will be protected if  at the time the decision was made the decision 
maker was: 1) disinterested (i.e., no conflicts or self-dealing), 2) reasonably 
informed about the circumstances relevant to the Collaboration, and 3) 
rationally believed the decision about the Collaboration to be made in the 
best interests of the organization.180  As a result, the activities of the 
Collaboration, mission pull or mission drift cannot be ignored.181  The 
Board and Others, to better ensure the protection of the business judgment 
rule, should continually evaluate, among other things: 1) if the 
Collaboration aligns with and will not interfere with the mission and goals 
of the Nonprofit,182 2) whether there is a market for the product or service 
 
 174. Vachon, supra note 35, at 37. 
 175. Tuckman, supra note 14, at 506. 
 176. Sean Silverthorne, Achieving Excellence in Nonprofits, Q & A with: Herman B. Leonard, 
HARV. BUS. SCH. (2008), http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/5942.html. 
 177. Andreasen, supra note 11, at 50. 
 178. Vachon, supra note 35, at 37. 
 179. Maram, supra note 45, at 3. 
 180. Peregrine & Schwartz, supra note 94, at 466. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 2, at 70. 
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to be generated by the Collaboration, 3) whether the Nonprofit will have 
resources to meet the needs of the Collaboration,183 4) whether the 
Collaboration fits with the purpose of the Nonprofit articulated in its 
Articles of Incorporation,184 and 5) whether the Collaboration will achieve 
the goals for the Nonprofit and not scar the Nonprofit with  prohibitive 
risk, including the risk of a tax-exempt Nonprofit losing its tax-exempt 
status.185  To monitor for mission drift during the Collaboration, the Board 
and Others should consider as part of their oversight function, among other 
things, setting up a compliance program that monitors for the following 
issues.186 
The hiring or increased involvement of people in the day to day 
function of the organization’s business who become or are already 
driven by personal gain and, therefore, spend the majority of their 
time on For-profit activities and begin to neglect or completely lose 
the mission of philanthropy that, by and large, does not generate 
profit.  Similarly, the people in the day-to-day business of the 
Nonprofit start to reallocate their work pursuits towards the 
commercial activities and away from the philanthropic activities that 
support the mission.  The commercial venture may cause increased 
pressure on Nonprofits to neglect certain aspects of the Nonprofits 
philanthropic activities that support the mission.  There may be 
conflicts of interest between the mission of the Nonprofit and the 
intent of the commercial activities.  For instance, money may be 
raised in the philanthropic, non-commercial activities but end up 
being channeled towards the betterment of For-profit activities or 
actually bailing out failed commercial projects, including a cross-
sector Collaboration.  These concepts are symptomatic but not 
necessarily conclusive.187 
Essential to ensuring that these processes are effective, the Board and 
Others need to create and implement a strategy and system to accomplish 
 
 183. Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 2, at 70. 
 184. If the Articles articulate an exclusively narrowly defined purpose or purposes, then that may 
preclude the organization from functioning in a commercial venture even if for an insubstantial amount.  
Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 2, at 77.  “To that end, the Articles of a social service nonprofit 
organization seeking exemption from federal income tax should contain a statement of purpose that 
reflects the charitable purposes identified in Section 501(c)(3) of the Code.  Additionally, the Articles 
must obligate the organization to further such exempt purposes as its primary activity and prohibit the 
organization from engaging in any meaningful way in activities that are not in furtherance of some 
exempt purpose.”  Id. at 77–78. 
 185. Id. at 70. 
 186. See Runquist, supra note 141, at 31 (stating that while the IRS Code does not require these 
types of policies and procedures, the implication from Form 990 is that a well-run Nonprofit would 
have the policies and procedures such as conflicts of interest policy, whistle-blower policy, record 
retention and destruction policy, compensation policy, joint venture policy (which is relevant to joint 
ventures with For-profit partners), Form 990 disclosure policy, governance disclosure policy etc.). 
 187. Vachon, supra note 35, at 59. 
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the mission and goals in light of the Collaboration.  The Caremark court 
determined that in certain circumstances, a director’s failure to reasonably 
oversee the implementation and continued application of this system could 
be a breach of the director’s duty of care.188 
 In the realm of Collaboration with a For-profit, a Nonprofit’s board 
must carefully consider the legality and ethics of the Nonprofit’s 
collaboration and potential commercialization.  In particular, the 
Nonprofit’s Board should ensure that the intended goals and operations of 
the collaboration align with the Nonprofit’s mission189 and that there is a 
means to ensure continued alignment.  Further, if involvement in the 
collaborative venture drifts from the original path and endangers the 
Nonprofit’s mission, and tax-exempt status, there are safety measures in 
place to ensure a proper and legal response.190 
 
VI.  DUTY OF CARE INTERTWINED? 
 
Here is one of the biggest challenges in philanthropy today—there is 
just not enough money.  Even if you put together what all the governments 
and all the philanthropies in the world spend to help poor and vulnerable 
people, the financial resources would not be enough to solve the 
fundamental problems.  It will take much more—and more will have to 
come from private investment capital.191 
The next question is whether, pursuant to its duty of care, the For-
profit has an obligation to ensure that the Nonprofit does not experience 
mission drift—arguably, yes, the deeper the Collaboration is along the 
Continuum.  This section sets forth the analysis that may determine 
whether the Board and Others of the For-profit should consider the care of 
the Nonprofit as part of its oversight function under its duty of care to the 
For-profit.  A first consideration for this analysis is that movement forward 
through the various stages along the Continuum does not happen 
automatically.  Moreover, a Collaboration, in fact, can fall backwards 
 
 188. In re Caremark It’l Inc., Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996); Sean Silverthorne, 
Achieving Excellence in Nonprofits, Q & A with: Herman B. Leonard, HARV. BUS. SCH. (October 27, 
2008), http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/ 5942.html.  “The court in dicta in the In re Caremark Int’l, Inc., 
Derivative Litig. matter identified the duty of the director to oversee the organization’s compliance 
programs.  The Caremark court stated that the duty includes a good faith attempt to assure that (i) a 
corporate information and reporting system exists and is adequate based on Board determination; and 
(ii) the organization’s information and reporting system is adequate to capture and provide reliable and 
appropriate information to the Board concerning organizational compliance with applicable laws in a 
timely way and in the ordinary course of business.”  Vachon, supra note 34, at 59 (referring to In re 
Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970).  See also In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 
2006); Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 363 (Del. 2006). 
 189. Dees, supra note 3, at 10. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Grants & Grantees, THE ROCKEFELLER FOUND. (Feb. 3, 2011), http://www.rockefeller 
foundation.org/grants. 
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and/or fail along that Continuum as well.  The status on the Continuum is 
determined as a result of the collaborating partners’ efforts and activities to 
support the Collaboration.192  If the Collaboration venture fails, a For-profit 
can usually absorb financial failure more readily than the Nonprofit that 
most likely has a small staff and limited resources.193 
A second consideration is derived from the application of 
psychological theory to the Collaboration.  The psychologist Piaget’s 
theory about childhood development has been applied to corporations, 
Boards, and Others, finding in general that a corporation and its 
management will function better and more ethically if less dominated and 
constrained.194  The dominant theme from Piaget’s research was that 
children will not develop into autonomous and morally responsible adults 
without having had the experience of cooperative play and other childhood 
ventures with those who are the child’s equals.195  Society in general seems 
to be ideally modeled from Piaget’s equilibrium concepts of autonomy, 
cooperation and reciprocity (“Ideal Model”).196  Characteristics of this Ideal 
Model include “relatively equal and free autonomous beings seeking their 
own ends and respecting the ends of others with agreement on the general 
principle that each should have the opportunity to do just that and that 
governmental restraint is justified only to sustain that possibility.”197  In 
today’s society, the corporation is taking on more and more characteristics 
of the natural person under the law, and is also comprised of natural 
persons that exercise the corporation’s decision-making functions and 
general oversight.  Given the nature of the Collaboration, with the 
Nonprofit usually in need of funds from the For-profit, and maybe in need 
of business expertise, it may be argued that the For-profit has greater 
potential for treating the Nonprofit as an inferior or a subordinate and 
thereby creating the antithesis of the Ideal Model.  In this way, under 
Piaget’s theory, if a For-profit were to conduct itself in the Collaboration in 
this oppressive manner, the Nonprofit’s development in the Collaboration 
may suffer, including its moral autonomy thereby implicating mission drift.  
Mission drift would lead to varying problems for the Nonprofit, the worst 
being failure of the entity and/or violations of IRS regulations. 
A third factor is that the failure of one collaborator in the 
Collaboration can have negative impacts on the other collaborator with 
 
 192. AUSTIN, supra note 5, at 35. 
 193. Andreasen, supra note 11, at 50. 
 194. Mitchell, supra note 19, at 498 (“[T]he relationship between managers and other corporate 
constituent groups is characterized by exactly the kind of dominance that Piaget found not only stifles 
the moral development of the weaker parties but also leads the strong party to be inattentive to 
rationality and justice.”). 
 195. Mitchell, supra note 19, at 499. 
 196. Id. at 500. 
 197. Id. 
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increasing intensity the deeper into the Continuum the Collaboration has 
moved.  A cross-sector collaborator engaging in a Collaboration with a 
“tainted partner”198 can have disastrous effects for the collaborator.  This 
has been true in the circumstances where a Nonprofit collaborates with a 
For-profit, and the For-profit’s activities taint the Nonprofit so that even 
basic fundraising becomes painfully damaged.199  Similarly, if a For-profit 
collaborates with a Nonprofit, and the Nonprofit violates the Internal 
Revenue Code or fails entirely as an organization, the For-profit may also 
suffer by affiliation.  From the For-profit’s point of view, the most valuable 
contribution the Nonprofit can make to the Collaboration is its image.200  If 
the Nonprofit violated the IRS’ tax-exempt requirements and/or 
experienced mission drift due to the pull of mission distortion from the 
Collaboration, the For-profit’s image would be damaged. 
The relationship between the For-profit and the Nonprofit seeking to 
collaborate relates to their engagement with each other.  But it also exists 
in the historical context, of which some claim that many of the reasons for 
the Nonprofit’s existence and the philanthropic considerations of the For-
profit exist due to the problems created by the drive for success of For-
profits as a collective at the expense of stakeholders.201  When a Nonprofit 
and For-profit collaborate, it first may be argued that the For-profit has an 
ethical obligation to ensure the care and sustainability of the Nonprofit in 
the Collaboration due to the nature of its relationship to the For-profit and 
the strong pull of mission distortion caused by the For-profit. 
The ethical perspective may not suit the nature of the For-profit, but a 
second argument is that the Board and Others of a collaborating For-profit 
have an obligation to ensure the care and sustainability of the Nonprofit 
because their duty of care to the For-profit requires it.  This premise 
depends on how far the Collaboration is positioned along the Continuum.  
The duty of care requires that the For-profit Board and Others be informed.  
By being informed, they will understand that the deeper into the 
Continuum the more that the success of the Collaboration depends upon the 
sustainability of the Nonprofit.  The success of the Nonprofit is affected by, 
among other things the possibilities of mission drift caused by the mission 
distortion pull from the Collaboration.  Consequently, the Nonprofit’s 
sustainability determines the success of the For-profit’s engagement in the 
Collaboration.  The success of the Collaboration determines the success of 
the business decision by the For-profit to enter into the Collaboration to 
achieve its articulated goals, such as image improvements, customer 
loyalty, etc.  Further, the duty of care requires that they act with “requisite 
 
 198. Andreasen, supra note 11, at 50. 
 199. Id. at 50–51. 
 200. Id. at 56. 
 201. BORNSTEIN & DAVIS, supra note 21, at 4–6. 
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care.”  Knowing that the sustainability of the Nonprofit determines the 
sustainability of the Collaboration, the For-profit Board and Others 
arguably need to determine the level of care owed to ensure the success of 
the investment in the Collaboration which may include ensuring the 
sustainability of the Nonprofit.202 
If, for instance, the For-profit entered into the Collaboration to 
improve its image, the image would be damaged if the For-profit were 
associated with a Nonprofit that violated laws related to its tax-exempt 
status.  The chances of failure of the Collaboration can be greatly reduced 
by both parties taking steps to ensure the sustainability of the Nonprofit.  
Many risks of the Collaboration failing due to sustainability of the 
Nonprofit center on the premise that the Nonprofit should be treated not as 
charity but as true equal in the Collaboration.203  In the case of the success 
of “Charge Against Hunger,” American Express’ Collaboration with the 
Nonprofit, Share Our Strength, the money that flooded in as a result of the 
Collaboration venture between the two could have overwhelmed Share Our 
Strength, such that it would have had more funds and request for use than it 
could handle.  Instead, American Express anticipated this possible issue, 
and established a separate endowment and assisted the Nonprofit to help 
establish the necessary procedures and processes to meet the resulting 
increased activity from the Collaboration.204  In this way, American 
Express struck the balance of ensuring that the Nonprofit did not succumb 
to pressures associated with the Collaboration but still participated in the 
Collaboration without abusing its tax-exempt status.205 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
New problems create new opportunities for philanthropy.  Increased 
need has led to increased numbers of Nonprofits, straining the already 
limited resources.  Increased need, on the other hand, combined with the 
changing perspective on corporate value, has created new opportunities for 
For-profit organizations to add value, including and most practically 
through cross-sector Collaboration with a Nonprofit.  There are various 
stages on the Continuum at which the collaborators may engage.  As the 
level of engagement becomes higher, so too does the need for the Board 
 
 202. Austin & Reficco, supra note 1, at 90 (explaining that at the integrative stage, there is at least 
one example where the For-profit held a seat on the Nonprofit partner’s board of directors and had 
become engaged in the governance of that partner). 
 203. Andreasen, supra note 11, at 48.  Clearly, the interest in the well-being of the Nonprofit should 
not rise to the level as to implicate a conflict of interest or breach of the corresponding duty of loyalty. 
Id. 
 204. Id. at 55.  See also Richard Alan Nelson, Ali M. Kanso, & Steven R. Levitt, Integrating Public 
Service and Marketing Differentiation: An Analysis of the American Express Corporation’s “Charge 
Against Hunger” Promotion Program, in SERV. BUS. 275-93 (SPRINGER-VERLAG 4d ed. 2007). 
 205. PANEL, supra note 34, at 3. 
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and Others to be involved so as to properly exercise their duty of care, 
decision making and oversight.  Confronting issues early on and 
continually assessing legal considerations such as those identified in this 
paper, allows the Collaboration a better opportunity to be stronger and last 
longer, with fewer unwelcome surprises for both collaborators.  Further, 
since the cross-sector Collaborations pose a ripe, new opportunity for both 
types of entities to develop as entrepreneurs in a sense, the law in this area 
continues to experience parallel changes and enhancements, an exciting 
area to explore.  As part of the entrepreneurial nature of the business 
venture and the law, the collaborators need to be vigilante as to what that 
means for the duty of care.  In particular, the unique nature of the cross-
sector Collaboration between a Nonprofit and a For-profit may require that 
the For-profit make efforts to ensure the sustainability of the Nonprofit 
contrary to the possibility of mission drift and other Collaboration effects.  
The risks for negative consequences to the Nonprofit increase the further 
along the Continuum if steps are not taken to counter the effects of the 
Collaboration to the culture and mission of the Nonprofit.206  This paper 
establishes that a For-profit should view the sustainability of the 
collaborating Nonprofit as a responsibility under its own duty of care.  This 
responsibility focuses on the unique influences of the Collaboration on the 
Nonprofit and ensuring that the Nonprofit does not abuse the tax-exempt 
status and maintains adequate measures in place to continue pursuit of the 
mission. 
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